Deliberative Citizenship: The Deliberate Democrats’ Response to the Hegemony of Classical Liberalism by Kanter, David
  Volume 7 | Spring 2012           45
David Kanter
Abstract
 Classical liberalism’s hegemony in the public discourse seems 
to be based on the fact that it demands and expects so little. Its guiding 
assumption tell us that people are the same, always and everywhere, and we 
can get the best by assuming the worst. Let’s just assume humans are simple 
automatons, it seems to say, and then we can arrive at elegant and simple 
conclusions about how society works and, more importantly, should work. 
Humans, then, are rationally self-interested and to get the best outcomes we 
should let these simple automatons interact in the market. The central point 
that comes from the deliberative democrats—and that they might do better 
to elaborate more explicitly—is that to assume simple rational self-interest 
and thus the impossibility of genuine democratic decision-making is really 
to miss the point. If we take a more realistic and complex view of human 
motivation, the deliberative democrats tell us, we recognize that individuals 
act in all sorts of different ways and are capable of developing and refining 
new and complex motivations. If the deliberative democrats are willing 
to acknowledge this important space for conflict and disagreement, what 
they have recovered from Tocqueville and Mill is an alternative program 
to Smith’s classical liberalism. What that program needs now are public 
champions willing and able to present this alternative way of thinking 
about the social world to members of society. What is needed is a revolution 
in ideas.
Deliberative Citizenship: The Deliberate 




 In contemporary Western society, most notably in the United States, 
what one might call the “classical liberal project” has achieved a certain 
ideological hegemony. If not hegemony, then that project has at least achieved 
ideological predominance. That is, though those participating in public 
discourse generally do not appeal to the rigorous classical liberal formulations 
worked out in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, nor even to cruder, less 
rigorous formulations, like those advanced in Milton Friedman’s Capitalism 
and Freedom, the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the classical liberal 
tradition predominate in elite and lay circles alike: society can be understood
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as a collection of atomistic individuals, each engaged in a rational pursuit 
of maximum utility. Such egoistic behavior, as Smith so eloquently argued, 
promotes a better, more satisfactory outcome for all.  
 When the core assumptions of classical liberalism are stated in 
such stark terms, perhaps we should not be surprised if many people 
deny subscribing to such notions. After all, those assumptions portray the 
individual as quite cold and heartless; even if “rationally maximizing utility” 
can be twisted to mean “engaging in social or altruistic acts,” do those 
assumptions really describe why one might be motivated to engage in such 
acts, or describe how each individual relates to every other individual in 
society? Despite this somewhat unsettling feeling one might get upon facing 
up to classical liberalism’s key assumptions, that tradition has achieved 
ideological hegemony precisely because those key assumptions are taken for 
granted in our discourse and, outside of certain academic circles, are rarely 
challenged or called into question. We accept, almost without question, the 
notion of “human capital”—that individuals can be valued in terms of the 
market returns they can be expected to earn; we accept, almost without 
question, the notion of incentive-based pay—that better and more committed 
performance is contingent upon increased wages and benefits; we accept, 
almost without question, the right to unlimited material accumulation. If one 
steps back from those notions for a moment, one will see that undergirding 
them all are certain assumptions about the individual and society—the 
assumptions of the classical liberal tradition.
 Western society, however, also maintains a commitment to 
democracy—the notion that public questions should be resolved through 
some process of collective decision-making. Market-oriented classical 
liberalism, however, exists in fundamental tension with the conscious, 
collective decision-making of democracy. market outcomes are so bountiful, 
Smith argued, precisely because they are not consciously controlled; it is the 
activity of the self-interested, rationally-calculating individual in interplay 
with the activity of every other self-interested, rationally-calculating 
individual that promotes the best possible collective outcome. Nearly any 
attempt to distort such individual activity through conscious, collective 
decision-making, so the classical liberal argument goes, will prevent the 
optimal social outcome from being achieved. 
 How should society deal with this fundamental tension? Smith’s 
answer in the 18th century is echoed by many contemporary classical liberals: 
give the market the greatest scope possible and let the sovereign state power 
deal with any issues that the market cannot resolve. For these Smithian 
classical liberals, democracy is not a real alternative because they assume 
that all individuals, always and everywhere, are rationally self-interested. 
When individuals can only be expected to pursue self-interested ends, 
democratic decision-making inevitably culminates in chaos. Politics for them 
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then necessarily implies coercion, whereas the market place is the realm of 
freedom. Given this pessimistic view of political possibility, classical liberals 
insist on maximizing the scope of market activity.
 Another strain in classical liberalism, however, holds that some sort 
of democratic decision-making is possible. This sort of thinking comes out 
most clearly in the work of Anthony Downs. Yet the notion of democracy 
promoted by Downs simply takes the basic assumption of rational self-
interest and applies it to the political sphere: Politicians simply do whatever it 
takes to win elections and voters simply vote for those politicians whom they 
expect to secure them the biggest payoffs. Though Downs calls the political 
sphere “democratic,” Downsian democracy is really just an extension of the 
market.
 Both the Smithian denial of democratic decision-making and 
the narrow, limited, and circumscribed notion of Downsian democratic 
decision-making exist in direct contrast, however, to the dominant strain in 
contemporary democratic theory—deliberative democracy. The deliberative 
democrats—notably Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, John Rawls, 
and Joshua Cohen—promote an active, engaged citizenry committed to 
the resolution of a whole host of public issues. Most simply, they envision 
citizens and political elites alike engaged in a give-and-take of reasons 
and arguments concerning public affairs. Ultimately, some sort of binding 
vote must follow deliberation, but the alternatives supported by the most 
compelling reasons should win out. 
 The development of this strain of democratic theory is highly 
promising. The emphasis on active, engaged citizens working together to 
resolve a whole range of public issues revives the notion prevalent in John 
Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville that challenges the central supposition 
of Smithian classical liberalism: Conscious, collective decision-making 
ensures more optimal outcomes than those provided by the market. That 
is, bottom-up control over public issues is a genuine possibility and is our 
best recourse for resolving those issues. Additionally, the real possibility 
of a process of deliberative reason-giving calls into question the Downsian 
notion of democracy as a mere political marketplace.
 The central notion that the deliberative democrats recover from 
Mill and Tocqueville is that the simple assumption of humans as rational 
maximizers with immutable preferences and opinions is simply misguided. 
A more realistic and complex understanding of human motivation forces us 
to admit that deliberation is necessary either for the discovery of previously 
non-existent preferences and opinions, or, alternatively, for the sharpening 
and amendment of previously held preferences and opinions. This discovery, 
sharpening, and changing of preferences and opinions is an essential step 
in the arrival to optimal collective outcomes. Given this more complex and 
realistic understanding of human nature, the deliberative democrats also
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importantly borrow from Tocqueville and Mill in recognizing that 
consequential deliberation can change the values and commitments 
of individuals; since human motivation is dynamic, the very practice 
of deliberation can transform human motivation, inculcating the very 
orientation necessary for successful deliberation. The deliberative democrats 
thus hold that the successful resolution of public issues cannot come about 
from throwing together individual preferences and hoping that a market 
mechanism spits out satisfactory outcomes. Citizens actually have to 
consciously think about what is in their best interest and pursue the goals 
that they decide upon.
 The deliberative democrats, however, are quite worried about the 
possibility that deliberative decision-making could devolve into chaos, as 
the Smithians would expect to be the inevitable outcome of deliberative 
decision-making. To prevent the breakdown of democratic deliberation, the 
deliberative democrats limit both the scope of democratic decision-making—
what issues are up for debate—and the form of democratic decision-
making—what sorts of reasons and arguments can be utilized. Yet putting 
artificial limits on the scope and form of deliberation in order to stifle conflict 
and disagreement defeats the entire purpose of the deliberative project. That 
is, to foster genuine solidarity among citizens, they must be allowed to work 
through genuine conflict and disagreement. Acknowledging that conflict 
and disagreement are essential to developing a commitment to democratic 
decision-making also implies that non-deliberative forms of political 
activity founded in conflict and disagreement are critically important; non-
deliberative activities can promote solidarity, pave the way for further 
deliberation, and settle scores once deliberation has been exhausted.
The Classical Liberal Project
 Most fundamentally, classical liberalism holds that the narrow 
pursuit of material self-interest by each individual gives the optimal collective 
outcome. That is, the individual pursuit of self-interested ends ensures, in the 
words of Adam Smith, “that universal opulence which extends itself to the 
lowest ranks of the people.”1 Part of what makes Smith’s formulation of this 
central principle of the classical liberal framework so jarring is that it goes 
against intuition. It is more intuitive to argue that conscious effort towards 
the achievement of the common good is what is actually necessary to bring 
about the socially optimal outcome. But such conscious effort towards the 
achievement of the common good is precisely what Smith—and the classical 
liberal tradition that grew out of his work—fears. Everyone in society, from 
the lowest laborer to the mightiest capitalist, Smith argues, would be worse 
off if we began with intentions of maximizing the common good.
 Undergirding this entire framework, as might be apparent by now, 
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are a few simple assumptions about human nature. Smith and the classical 
liberals assume that humans are self-interested rational maximizers. That is, 
each individual essentially does whatever he can to “better his condition.”2 
When making decisions, then, the individual generally weighs the costs and 
benefits of the various alternatives and, in turn, pursues the alternative that 
gives him the highest expected payoff. Given this assumption that humans 
are more or less self-interested creatures, they tend to have a propensity to 
exchange various goods and services. This self-interested impulse towards 
exchange in turn encourages specialization in the production of goods 
and services; specialization allows individuals and firms to produce better 
goods and services at lower costs. Specialization, however, begets ever-more 
specialization because each producer needs to produce a better and cheaper 
product than all his competitors, and this increase in quality and decrease 
in cost will only come about via greater specialization. The market is the 
impersonal, self-regulating system that promotes increasing specialization 
in production. What is really fundamental in Smith’s argument is that each 
producer produces for any given consumer willing to buy, and the consumer 
rationally makes his buying decision based solely on an evaluation of the 
good’s quality and price. In the marketplace, according to the classical liberal 
argument, traditions, customs, manners, and mores do not and should not 
interfere; each individual can be reduced to a self-interested, completely 
rational buyer and seller of goods and services. 
 The impersonal mechanism that regulates this entire system of 
completely rational buying and selling is price. Smith defines the natural 
price of any good or service as the sum of the various wages paid to the 
laborers in the productive process, the profit extracted by the capitalist who 
owns the means of production, and the rent demanded by the landlord.3 
Contemporary economists would probably call Smith’s notion of “natural 
price” the equilibrium price in the market, as Smith argues that the market 
price—the price actually paid by the consumer for the good or service—will 
tend to gravitate around the natural price. 4 This equilibrium price emerges 
in the market in a completely impersonal manner. That is, all producers are 
forced to sell at that price because if they sold at a higher price nobody would 
buy their product—consumers would simply buy from a competitor selling 
at the equilibrium price—and if they sold at a lower price they would be 
losing money—their costs would be greater than their revenues—and they 
would be forced out of business. 
 Any attempt to interfere with the price mechanism would cause the 
entire system to ‘short circuit’; with conscious interference in a system of 
rational self-interest, producers would no longer feel the pressure to produce 
better and cheaper goods and services, productivity would slacken, and 
society would fail to realize the optimal outcome. That is, with any active 
interference in the market, market discipline would break down resources 
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would be inefficiently allocated, and the consequences would reverberate 
throughout society. The capitalists who own the productive resources and 
the wage-laborers who work on their behalf would both be left worse off, in 
general, in a situation of market interference. 
 If optimal collective outcomes are dependent upon an impersonal, 
self-regulating market system guided by price signals, what space might be 
left for conscious, collective decision-making? Smithian classical liberals re-
ply that no space at all should be left for conscious decision-making. Given 
the assumption of rational self-interest, the Smithians contend that any at-
tempt at conscious decision-making would culminate in chaotic violence. 
Milton Friedman, a Smithian classical liberal writing in the second half of the 
20th century, contends that deliberation “tends toward ineffectiveness and 
fragmentation...If it goes so far as to touch an issue on which men feel deeply 
yet differently, it may well disrupt the society.”5 Smithian classical liberals, 
like Friedman, thus hold that democratic decision-making is dangerous pre-
cisely because it might result in disagreement. The next logical step from 
disagreement is violence. As Friedman puts it, “The religious and civil wars 
of history are a bloody testament to this judgment.”6 
 Given that democratic decision-making inevitably culminates in 
chaotic violence, Smithian classical liberals think there are only two possible 
ways to structure society. As Friedman puts it, “One is central direction in-
volving the use of coercion...The other is voluntary co-operation of individu-
als—the technique of the market place.”7 Politics for the classical liberals is 
thus inevitably top-down coercion. To the extent that we are going to have 
politics and avoid chaotic violence, it must involve coercion. Freedom, then, 
cannot be achieved in the political sphere. Freedom, for the classical liber-
als, increases to the extent that politics is avoided and decisions are made 
impersonally in the market place. For the classical liberals, freedom increases 
the more we move to the market not so much because the market promises 
to settle disagreements, but rather because the market mechanism simply 
ignores those very conflicts and disagreements. As Friedman puts it, “The 
wider the range of activities covered by the market, the fewer are the issues 
on which explicitly political decisions are required.”8 Fewer “explicitly polit-
ical decisions” are required not because the market promises to satisfactorily 
settle disagreements, but precisely because the market tends to ignore those 
disagreements or give an outcome that is “impersonal” and thus supposedly 
“just.”
 What duties, then, do Smith and Friedman believe should be left 
to a sovereign state entity? Simply those things that the market cannot ad-
equately address. Smith identifies only three duties that fit this description: 
Protection from external attack, internal security, and the provision of public 
goods. Tolerable security—the protection of property from both external and 
internal attack—thus emerges in the Smithian argument as a necessary and 
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fundamental precondition for the entire market system. As Smith puts it, “It is 
only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable 
property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many 
successive generations, can sleep a single night in security.”9 Friedman like-
wise envisions some sort of state security apparatus to undergird the whole 
functioning of the market system. Friedman expects the government to sim-
ply be a “rule-maker and umpire.”10 That is, members of society can agree on 
the rules governing private property rights, and then the state is responsible 
for interpreting those rules and for enforcing “compliance with the rules on 
the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game.”11 
 The necessity of a state security apparatus comes out when we con-
sider Thomas Hobbes’ argument from Leviathan. Hobbes makes essentially 
the same assumptions about human nature as Smith and Friedman—humans 
are self-interested, rational maximizers—but, beginning from these assump-
tions, his vision of society is quite different than theirs. Hobbes concludes 
that a rationally self-interested individual would attack and steal from every 
other individual, resulting in a typical life that he calls “solitary, poore, nas-
ty, brutish, and short.”12 Why do Smith and Friedman, if they begin with the 
same assumptions, argue that rather than “solitary and poor,” self-interested 
man’s life has the opportunity to be optimal? It is because their whole mar-
ket system depends on a precondition of security—that there will be some 
state entity around to enforce property rights and enforce the fulfillment of 
contracts. While arguing that the market system gives the best possible out-
comes for everyone in society, Smith is still cognizant of the fact that these 
outcomes will still be vastly unequal.13 In order to prevent the vast mass of 
people from simply ransacking those that derive the greatest benefits from 
the market system, there needs to be a security apparatus in place to ensure 
that property rights are respected and contracts are enforced. 
 In addition to providing the security that is a necessary precondi-
tion for the whole market system, Smith and Friedman identify one other 
primary duty for the state entity. That duty is the provision of public goods 
or, as Smith puts it, “The duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick 
works and certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest 
of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain.”14 
The sorts of goods that Smith and Friedman have in mind here are those 
goods—like national defense or transportation infrastructure—that, once 
provided, are open to every member of society’s use and enjoyment. Since 
every member of society will be able to make use of those goods, regardless 
of whether or not each member of society pays his fair share for the produc-
tion of those goods, no private entity would ever have any incentive to pro-
vide those goods. In these textbook instances of “market breakdown” and 
only in these instances, Smith and Friedman argue, government should step 
in and provide the good. But so long as there are no market breakdowns—so 
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long as producers have a self-interested incentive to sell high and consumers 
have a self-interested incentive to buy low—then the sovereign state entity 
should defer to the market place (or, at the very least, only provide the secu-
rity that permits market activity). 
 Certain thinkers in the classical liberal tradition, however, are will-
ing to acknowledge democracy as an alternative to either the market place 
(backed up by a sovereign state apparatus) or complete top-down sover-
eignty. Nevertheless, this strain in the classical liberal tradition maintains the 
same fundamental assumption as the rest of the classical liberal tradition: 
Individuals are rationally self-interested maximizers. It takes that simple as-
sumption, however, and applies it to the political sphere, depicting demo-
cratic decision-making as just another sphere for the pursuit of rational self-
interest. This strain of classical liberalism comes out most clearly in Anthony 
Downs’ influential book An Economic Theory of Democracy. Downs tells us that 
his rational man, much like Smith and Friedman’s, confronts all the various 
choice alternatives, ranks each of those alternatives, and then chooses that al-
ternative that he ranks the highest.15 In Downs, unlike in Smith or Friedman, 
these choices can be political choices, with “choice” being equated to “vote.” 
The voter, then, can be equated to the consumer in Smith’s model, while the 
politician (or political party) can simply be equated to the producer. Each of 
these parties has already decided what it wants before any interaction be-
tween the two takes place: The voter simply wants to vote in those politicians 
that will maximize his welfare, while the politician simply wants to receive 
as many votes as possible in order to win election. The mechanism here that 
enforces market discipline is the election: Each individual has one vote to 
cast in the election, so politicians should adjust their behavior in order to win 
as many of those votes as possible. Joseph Schumpeter, though a skeptic(like 
Smith and Friedman) of the very possibility of any form of democratic deci-
sion-making, gives a polemical description of the Downsian model:
Politically speaking, the man is still in the nursery who has 
not absorbed, so as never to forget, the saying attributed to 
one of the most successful politicians that ever lived: “What 
businessmen do not understand is that exactly as they are 
dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes.”16 
Schumpeter’s summation of the Downsian argument is helpful be-
cause it makes clear the motivation that is assumed to be at the base of demo-
cratic decision-making: Politicians pursue votes in the same way that busi-
nessmen pursue profits; voters pursue utility from the political market place 
in the same way that consumers pursue utility in the market place of goods 
and services. 
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The Deliberative Democrats: Reviving the Classical Promise of Democracy
 The deliberative democrats—notably Rawls, Cohen, and Gutmann 
and Thompson—would find common ground with two of the classical theo-
rists of democracy, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, in the identifi-
cation of the fundamental flaw in the classical liberal argument, in both in its 
Smithian and Downsian versions. The classical liberals, as we have seen, sim-
ply assume that individuals are rational maximizers with immutable prefer-
ences for every possible choice situation. Yet what the deliberative democrats 
want to signal is much what Tocqueville and Mill signal about individual 
preferences and opinions: they are often non-existent, and therefore depend 
on deliberation for their discovery. And even when they do exist, delibera-
tion is essential in the process of sharpening and revising those previously 
held preferences and opinions. Given this more realistic and complex under-
standing of human motivation, both the classical theorists of democracy and 
the deliberative democrats want to argue that we cannot simply expect to 
arrive to optimal outcomes through the interplay of immutable preferences 
and opinions in a market place. Deliberation is a necessary first step in the de-
velopment and revision of opinions and preferences and, consequently, can-
not simply be separated from the arrival to collective outcomes. The classical 
liberals—and those engaged in the public discourse that increasingly clings 
to its basic assumptions—simply abstract away from the very real complex-
ity that is involved in the resolution of real public issues and therefore miss 
out on what is really essential. Downs, somewhat surprisingly, seems to be 
aware of this central problem in his tradition’s approach: “Even though psy-
chological considerations have a legitimate and significant place in both eco-
nomics and political science, we by-pass them entirely.”17 
 Mill, in his classic work Considerations on Representative Government, 
importantly recognizes that human nature is complex and fickle. He tells 
us, “It is what men think, that determines how they act...”18 Rather than just 
simply assuming that men, always and everywhere, are rational maximizers 
with immutable preferences and opinions, he emphasizes that the individ-
ual’s motivations are contingent on the influences that he receives from the 
social world around him. That is, by changing those very social influences, 
man’s motivations—his values, his beliefs, his orientations—change in turn. 
Mill continues: 
And though the persuasions and convictions of average men 
are in a much greater degree determined by their personal 
position than by reason, no little power is exercised over 
them by the persuasions and convictions of those whose 
personal opinion is different, and by the united authority of 
the instructed.19
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 What Mill is getting at here is precisely what the deliberative 
democrats insist upon, and importantly reintroduce into democratic theory 
against the creeping predominance of the classical liberal perspective. Mill 
is explaining that one extremely important element in the formation of the 
individual’s values, preferences, and opinions is the sum of the various 
arguments and ideas to which he is exposed. Deliberation, by forcing the 
individual to engage with “persuasions and convictions” that differ from his 
own, compels the individual to clarify, sharpen, or amend his own views. 
Mill emphasizes the very real influence that contrary beliefs and ideas can 
have over previously settled preferences when he tells us, “Opinion is itself 
one of the greatest active social forces.”  What Mill seems to want to get 
across is that we cannot really say that a person holds a genuine preference 
or opinion until he has been exposed to a whole range of preferences or 
opinions. The formation of the individual’s preferences and opinions, then, 
depends on engagement in a deliberative context. The classical liberals, by 
making simple assumptions that take them to elegant conclusions, miss out 
on this realistic but fundamental complexity.
 The deliberative democrats pick up on this same sentiment, insisting 
on the complexity of human nature. This complexity, they argue, makes 
deliberation—a give-and-take of reasons and arguments concerning a given 
public issue—a necessary part of most successfully dealing with any given 
public issue. Gutmann and Thompson are quite direct in their refutation of 
the simple assumptions at the core of the classical liberal project:
 
 Citizens and officials sometimes—even often—act on self-interest,  
 but there is no warrant for assuming, as a theoretical postulate, that  
 they always, or even generally, act on this basis. Self-interested be 
 havior is not in any nonvacuous sense presumptively rational. We  
 should not regard the assumption of self-interest as the default posi 
 tion of deliberative democracy. 
 Part of their argument here is that to simply assume rational self-
interest rejects what mere observation can tells us: people often engage in 
acts that are altruistic or, at least, do not have any clear connection to what 
we might call self-interest. If the classical liberal responds that those altruistic 
or other-serving acts were themselves ultimately, in one way or another, 
“self-interested actions,” then the notion of self-interest “loses its critical 
content...”  The notion of self-interest, in that case, would be reduced to a 
mere tautology. 
 Additionally, a more fundamental part of their refutation of the 
simple assumption of rational self-interest has to do with their conviction, 
like in Mill, that preferences and opinions are contingent on deliberation 
itself. They argue that deliberation has the “capacity to encourage citizens and 
  Volume 7 | Spring 2012           55
David Kanter
officials to change their minds...”  Much the same comes out in Rawls when 
he contends that citizens must have “a capacity to form, follow, and revise 
their individual doctrines of the good.”  By engaging in constructive debate 
about a public issue, Gutmann,Thompson, and Rawls want to say that the 
somewhat hazy preferences and opinions of an individual can be given full 
shape; or, if the individual brings firmly held preferences and opinions to the 
deliberative forum, engagement with a whole host of alternative views and 
perspectives undoubtedly holds out the hope of modifying those preferences 
and opinions. According to this complex understanding of human nature, we 
cannot really talk about genuine preferences and opinions until individuals 
are engaged in deliberation with one another.
  This notion of mutable preferences and opinions, revived among the 
deliberative democrats, comes out most clearly in Cohen. He insists that being 
forced to air one’s previously held preferences and opinions in a deliberative 
forum can result in the discovery that there are no good reasons to support 
those preferences and opinions. As a result, those preferences and opinions 
must be abandoned.  Cohen proceeds to argue that the best preferences and 
opinions are those that survive a deliberative process oriented around the 
common good:
 The relevant conceptions of the common good are not comprised 
simply of interests and preferences that are antecedent to deliberation. 
Instead, the interests, aims and ideals that comprise the common good are 
those that survive deliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it 
legitimate to appeal to in making claims on social resources. 
 The sentiment here seems to be that once people in the deliberative 
forum are thinking in terms of alternatives that best promote the common 
good, the preferences and opinions that are most compelling after deliberation 
has taken place are the ones that command the most support. What is really 
fundamental here—and not brought out so clearly in Gutmann , Thompson, 
and Rawls—is that Cohen is insisting that often the best, most convincing 
preferences and opinions might not even exist prior to deliberation—they are 
not “antecedent to deliberation.” That is, to arrive at the best outcomes—to 
arrive at the most convincing and compelling reasons—we need deliberation. 
We cannot simply assume that all the possible preferences and opinions are 
already out there. Deliberation, Cohen insists, plays a fundamental role in 
either bringing out previously non-existent preferences or opinions, or at 
least clarifying ones that had only been developed in a partial and incomplete 
form in the minds of individual persons.
 
The Deliberative Democrats: Reviving Tocqueville and Mill’s Notion of 
Citizenship
 The deliberative democrats’ argument—their refutation of the 
classical liberal project and promotion of a deliberative decision-making 
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process—goes even deeper, however. At this point, the classical liberals might 
retort that Cohen’s argument considered above depends on an orientation 
around the common good. How can we simply assume that participants in 
deliberation will be committed to achieving the common good? The response 
from the deliberative democrats—reviving central notions in Tocqueville 
and Mill—would be that such a counter-argument is valid, to a point. That 
is, they would agree that we cannot simply assume or expect a commitment 
to the common good, in the same way that we cannot simply assume or 
expect rational self-interest. That being said, like Tocqueville and Mill 
and like I have signaled above, the deliberative democrats are committed 
to a more complex and realistic understanding of human nature: Human 
nature is mutable and depends on the individual’s interactions with his or 
her social context. The deliberative democrats, then, believe that genuine 
citizenship—a genuine willingness and ability to commit to a process of 
collective decision-making oriented around the common good—is possible. 
Participation in deliberation itself—active engagement in the deliberative 
process that culminates in consequential decisions that affect people’s life 
outcomes—allows individuals to develop a commitment to the common good 
and a skill set that makes them better able to delineate and arrive at that 
common good. By reviving this notion of active citizenship from Tocqueville 
and Mill, the deliberative democrats are promoting the notion that not only 
can meaningful deliberation help the individual identify, sharpen, or amend 
preferences and opinions concerning particular issues, but also, and more 
importantly, they are promoting that such deliberation is central to the 
cultivation of a certain orientation: a commitment to deliberative, democratic 
procedure oriented around the common good. When such an orientation 
is possible, the entire edifice undergirding the classical liberal framework 
crumbles away; outcomes arrived at “impersonally” in the market are no 
longer satisfactory to genuine citizens. A fundamental part of what is 
involved in arriving to the optimal outcome is consciously thinking about 
and deciding upon that outcome.
 To understand the possibility of genuine citizenship it will be 
helpful to begin with an examination of the notion of citizenship in two of 
the classical theorists of democracy, Tocqueville and Mill. By getting a sense 
of what these two theorists mean by “citizenship” and what they think is 
necessary to bring it about, it will be easier to recognize a revival of this same 
notion among the contemporary deliberative democrats.
 Tocqueville contends that the cultivation of genuine citizenship—
the development of what he would call the mores of citizenship—is a 
genuine possibility, but not a possibility that we can simply assume or 
expect. Citizenship, for Tocqueville, is something that must be actively 
cultivated and maintained. Taking this complex, realistic view of human 
motivation, Tocqueville acknowledges that another certain orientation that 
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approximates what the classical liberals would call rational self-interest 
is a very real possibility. Tocqueville denotes this orientation—this way of 
approaching the social world—“individualism,” and defines it as “a calm 
and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from 
the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends.”27 
Though individualism is not the same as rational self-interest—Tocqueville, 
after all, distinguishes individualism from mere egoism28—the two are similar 
understandings of human motivation: They both describe individuals who 
are primarily concerned with private affairs and outcomes who neglect to 
participate in cooperative social endeavors. It is important to note, however, 
that Tocqueville does not simply assume individualism in the way that 
classical liberals simply assume rational self-interest. Understanding human 
nature as mutable and fickle, Tocqueville recognizes that the development of 
individualism, like the development of all other forms of human motivation, 
is dependent upon the individual’s social context. 
 Tocqueville sees the development of individualism fundamentally 
as the result of the breakdown of the aristocratic social order. In the 
aristocratic age, individuals felt an obligation to work cooperatively—
though not necessarily democratically—with other members of their same 
class since each class formed “a little fatherland for all its members.”29 There 
were certain social norms and expectations that demanded, for instance, 
that peasants in the same village provide communal support to each other. 
Additionally, there were ties among unequals that linked “everybody, from 
peasant to king, in one long chain.”30 The growing social, political, and 
economic equality in the modern age, according to Tocqueville, has largely 
erased differences in rank and class, concurrently erasing these horizontal 
and vertical ties that at one time pulled people out of isolation and demanded 
communal activity. The resulting individualistic orientation—the resulting 
orientation that emphasizes private self-interest instead of communal 
activity—is itself self-reinforcing. A big part of what Tocqueville is saying 
is that if people are isolated and self-interested—if they really have come 
to approximate the atomized rational maximizers that the classical liberals 
envision—it is precisely because they have been left to be isolated and self-
interested. If they are not pulled out of isolation, if they are not forced to 
work with those outside of their small circle of family and friends, the values 
and commitments that undergird isolated self-interest become solidified 
and entrenched. As Tocqueville puts it, “They form the habit of thinking of 
themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their own 
hands.”31
 But, Tocqueville contends, individualism or rational self-interest 
or any other framework of human motivation is subject to transformation. 
That is, even if we observe atomized, self-interested individuals—
even if we concede that during a given moment in time individuals are 
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rational maximizers—that does not have to be the fate to which they are 
consigned. Observing individualism or rational self-interest does not 
mean that we should simply assume that people, always and everywhere, 
fit those motivational categories. What is subject to change, then, is what 
Tocqueville calls “mores,” or “the whole moral and intellectual state of a 
people.”32 That is, people’s values and orientations can be transformed. If 
individuals are currently solely concerned with narrow self-interest, they 
can undergo a process that changes their fundamental values, orientations, 
and commitments, compelling them to look beyond self-interest towards the 
common good.
 This transformation process is far from easy. At root in this process 
of transformation is active, engaged participation in political and social 
institutions that demand individuals to concern themselves with issues that 
are not merely private or personal and that force individuals to listen to and 
respond to the concerns, opinions, and ideas of others. What is involved in the 
cultivation and refinement of the mores of citizenship is participation in the 
very process of democratic deliberation that culminates in binding decisions 
that have real effects on other people’s life outcomes. That is, the very way 
to inculcate the spirit of the citizen is to not permit that the market simply 
give us outcomes, but rather to insist that people engage and deliberate with 
others in the process of resolving public decisions and coming to collective 
outcomes. When individuals are given real power—the ability to affect lives 
other than their own in powerful and meaningful ways—they are forced to 
learn the art and necessity of listening to various and divergent perspectives 
and opinions, of appealing to the interests of other people, of trying to find 
consensus or common ground. At the very least, when individuals are forced 
to advance arguments in deliberative forums, they come to learn the necessity 
of thinking about the interests of others and appealing to those very interests 
if they are to have their own perspectives taken seriously. Being forced 
to think about the interests of others in turn carries out the promise that 
individuals will come to acknowledge their shared interests and concerns. 
What is involved, then, in the development of the mores of citizenship is not 
only an increased commitment to the process of conscious decision-making, 
but also an increased skepticism about outcomes that are simply “spit out” 
by an impersonal market. The sharing of divergent perspectives and opinions 
can make clear to citizens that market outcomes are not satisfactory and that 
conscious decision-making provides more favorable outcomes. Deliberative 
engagement, then, can inculcate a commitment to the common good and a 
greater capacity to recognize what that common good might actually be. 
 The development of this orientation—this transformation in mores—
only comes about, then, when there are certain institutional frameworks in 
place that force individuals to work cooperatively together. One good example 
that Tocqueville examines at length is the institution of the jury trial. The 
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jury trial provides the proper institutional framework for the development 
of the mores of citizenship because “it puts the real control of affairs into the 
jury trial provides the proper institutional framework for the development 
of the mores of citizenship because “it puts the real control of affairs into the 
hands of the ruled...”33 By “real control” Tocqueville means that the results 
of the deliberation that goes on among the members of the jury have real, 
meaningful consequences in the life of someone else. The members of the jury, 
then, are authentically exercising power: Their deliberation has genuine and 
meaningful consequences, and they know it. By providing the framework 
for a meaningful, consequential give-and-take of reasons and arguments—
by giving the framework for what the deliberative democrats would hold 
as an ideal process of deliberation—jury trials have a peculiar affect on the 
commitments and values of jurors. Tocqueville elaborates:
Juries invest each citizen with a sort of magisterial office; 
they make all men feel that they have duties toward society 
and that they take a share in its government. By making 
men pay attention to things other than their own affairs, 
they combat that individual selfishness which is like rust in 
society.34 
By being given the opportunity to deliberate over the fate of another 
living, breathing human being—the opportunity to deliberate and then cast 
a consequential vote—individuals are compelled, or even forced, to take 
seriously interests and concerns outside of their own immediate interests 
and concerns. They are molded and shaped to think about the common 
good and to take it seriously. Contra the classical liberals, Tocqueville knows 
that human nature is dynamic. If given the proper institutional framework, 
certain values, commitments, and orientations can undoubtedly be brought 
out.
 Mill, like Tocqueville, regards the classical liberal assumption of 
rational self-interest, always and everywhere, as naively simple. He recognizes 
that we cannot simply assume rational self-interest because he knows that 
any sort of human motivation is dependent on particular social experiences. 
Thus when Mill tells us that “it is what men think, that determines how they 
act,”35 he is not just telling us that participation in processes of deliberative 
decision-making can change or sharpen our preferences and opinions on 
particular issues, but, more importantly, he is telling us that deliberation 
can change mores—our moral and intellectual values and commitments. 
Thus Mill, like Tocqueville, recognizes that particular social experiences 
have the potential to develop and reinforce a motivational disposition 
that approximates the classical liberals’ notion of rational self-interest. If 
individuals solely concern themselves with private interests and concerns, 
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if they are not forced out of isolation, he tells us that “good government is 
impossible.”36 That is, if individuals do develop the values and orientations 
of classical liberalism, individuals do develop the values and orientations of 
classical liberalism, then deliberative decision-making is really impossible. 
Allowing such individuals to engage in processes of self-determination 
would actually result in the chaos that Hobbes predicts and Smith and 
Friedman fear. 
 Yet Mill, like Tocqueville, understands that human motivation 
is dynamic: If individuals are given the proper institutional framework 
then the mores of citizenship can be developed and refined. Mill describes 
the powerful effect that participation in a jury or fulfilling a role in local 
government can have on the participant:
He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests 
not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by 
another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every 
turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of 
existence the common good...37
When individuals are forced to consider the conflicting claims and 
arguments of others, they cannot help but begin to orient their whole approach 
to their social world—their whole way of thinking and acting—around the 
good of the collectivity. As in Tocqueville, Mill emphasizes that this whole 
transformation in mores can only come about if the deliberation culminates 
in a binding decision that has real ramifications in the lives of others. That is 
why Mill insists that even though political discussion—deliberation, that is—
is essential to the development of a commitment to the good of the collectivity, 
“political discussions fly over the heads of those who have no votes...Their 
position, in comparison with the electors, is that of the audience in a court of 
justice, compared with the twelve men in the jury-box.”38 Mill is emphasizing 
here precisely what Tocqueville emphasizes: Deliberation is well and good, 
but it can only have a transformative impact on mores if the deliberation 
culminates in binding decisions that have real effects on other people’s lives. 
That is, those who merely listen to deliberation as a mere pastime—those in 
society unable to vote or those in the court audience, for instance—will come 
to feel neither a real responsibility to take divergent perspectives and opinions 
seriously nor a real responsibility to appeal to the interests of the group. The 
development of this responsibility—the development of this commitment to 
the good of the greater community—only comes when the individual knows 
that deliberation will have real consequences. By providing the institutional 
framework that demands responsible deliberation, Mill, like Tocqueville, 
insists that human motivation can change. Individuals can come to feel a 
real commitment to the common good, fundamentally rejecting the simple 
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assumption guiding the entire classical liberal project.
 The contemporary deliberative democrats recover the notion from 
Tocqueville and Mill that genuine citizenship is a real possibility. Like the 
classical theorists of democracy, they insist that the proper institutional 
framework can help foment a commitment to the deliberative resolution of 
public issues oriented around the common good. Because they revive this 
important notion of citizenship, they reject the classical liberal project in 
both its Smithian and Downsian forms. Contra Smith, the recognition that 
the spirit of the citizen is a real possibility provides a real and preferable 
alternative to a simple decision between either the marketplace or centralized, 
top-down sovereignty: Conscious, collective decision-making carried out by 
genuine citizens can assure us more optimal and more equitable outcomes 
than either an impersonal market or a centralized sovereign. Contra Downs, 
a classical liberal who at least acknowledges the possibility of some form of 
democratic decision-making, the deliberative democrats argue that applying 
the assumption of rational self-interest in the political sphere would lead 
us to outcomes that might actually be unsatisfactory to most or all of the 
participants involved; preferences and opinions require deliberation among 
citizens in order to be discovered, refined, and amended. The deliberative 
democrats insist that a deliberative process that changes specific preferences 
and opinions and, more importantly, inculcates entirely new commitments 
and values is a necessary step before we can even consider the aggregation 
of votes. 
 Rawls, Cohen, Gutmann, and Thompson all, in one form or another, 
recover Tocqueville and Mill’s notion of genuine citizenship in the face of 
the growing predominance of the classical liberal project. Rawls, however, 
assumes too much. In the same way that we question classical liberalism 
because of its naive assumptions, perhaps we can also charge Rawls with 
likewise making simple assumptions about the prevalence of the mores of 
citizenship. In any case, it will still be helpful to note the presence of genuine 
citizenship in his deliberative account. Gutmann Thompson, and Cohen 
do a better job of more clearly bringing out the fundamental relationship 
between process and mores. They recognize that forcing citizens to engage 
in consequential deliberation is what is essential to actually bringing out a 
commitment to the common good. Recognizing this possibility of genuine 
citizenship, they promote a much more realistic and complex alternative to 
the naively simple classical liberal project.
 Rawls’ account of democratic deliberation hinges on a notion that is 
also central in Gutmann Thompson, and Cohen—the notion of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity demands that when citizens advance reasons and arguments, they 
should endeavor to appeal to the interests, values, and beliefs of their fellow 
citizens. As Rawls puts it, “They should be ready to explain the basis of their 
actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might 
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endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.”39 That is, the process 
of deliberation should always be based in taking divergent preferences and 
opinions seriously. Citizens should try their best to reach consensus and find 
common ground in the resolution of public issues. This approach, after all, is 
what is involved in “understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic 
citizen.”40 Rawls, then, recognizes the possibility of genuine citizenship: it 
involves a commitment to the conscious, collective resolution of public issues. 
While importantly recovering the notion of democratic citizenship from 
Tocqueville and Mill, Rawls unfortunately glosses over the real complexity 
involved in inculcating the mores of citizenship. In the same way that Smith, 
Friedman, and Downs take rational self-interest as their theoretical starting 
point and build up a picture of society based on that simple assumption, Rawls 
can be faulted for similarly naive analytical shortcuts; in both his accounts 
of distributive justice and democratic decision-making, he simply assumes 
that we already have “democratic citizens” and does not really delve into 
working out the necessity of consequential deliberation for actually bringing 
out the spirit of the citizen. Nevertheless, we importantly do see in Rawls 
the notion of genuine citizenship—the insistence that market discipline or 
simple rational aggregation in a political marketplace are inadequate and 
insufficient processes for the resolution of public issues.
 Gutmann, Thompson, and Cohen provide a more complex and 
realistic picture of how citizenship is developed and refined. For Gutmann 
and Thompson, as for Rawls and Cohen, the principle of “reciprocity” is a 
central component of genuine citizenship: “The principle expresses a sense 
of mutuality that citizens and their representatives should bring to the public 
forum.”41 That is, if citizens are fulfilling the principle of reciprocity it means 
that they have certain commitments and values; it means that they have the 
mores of citizenship. As Gutmann and Thompson put it, “Mutual respect 
orients the deliberations of citizens and public officials toward a view of the 
common good—a common good that is compatible with continuing moral 
disagreement.”42 When citizens are taking various and conflicting interests, 
ideas, perspectives, and opinions seriously, they are committed to resolving 
issues in line with the good of the collectivity. They are genuine citizens, as 
Tocqueville and Mill have already described for us.
 Gutmann and Thompson, however, recognize that they cannot 
simply take for granted the values and commitments of genuine citizenship. 
Following Tocqueville and Mill, they recognize that human motivation is 
mutable. Directly referencing Mill, they contend that “citizens and their 
representatives are more likely to take a broader view of issues, and to 
consider the claims of more of their fellow citizens, in a process in which 
moral arguments are taken seriously.”43 We can only expect the principle 
of reciprocity in the deliberative forum to hold, then, if citizens are given 
the actual opportunity to engage in deliberation. It is in the very practice 
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of deliberation that atomistic, self-interested subjects are able to become 
citizens committed to conscious, collective decision-making oriented 
around the common good. Impersonal market outcomes come to be seen as 
unsatisfactory and deficient precisely because individuals are forced to hear 
the interests and concerns of others and are thus forced to recognize that 
many of these interests and concerns are not satisfied by market outcomes. 
 Reciprocity, however, is not merely assumed/taken for granted; it 
is an orientation that is developed and refined. The deliberation necessary 
to develop the mores of citizenship does not even need to occur in an 
explicitly political context. As Tocqueville emphasizes, any associational 
context—whether it be religious, recreational, social, or political—that forces 
individuals to hear contrary opinions and preferences and forces individuals 
to appeal to the interests of others can go a long way in developing and 
refining a commitment to the common good and the capacity to recognize that 
the common good is often not satisfied by the market.44 The same sentiment 
comes out in Gutmann and Thompson when they emphasize the importance 
of “a civil society that provides rehearsal space for political deliberation.”45 
By “rehearsal space” they seem to mean the sort of associations that are not 
explicitly political, but still demand deliberation for the purpose of reaching 
binding, meaningful decisions. Such associations have the potential, then, 
to inculcate the very orientation and commitments necessary for collective 
deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson, however, insist that “rehearsal” 
should not mean “meaningless”:
The deliberative process is not like a talk show or an academic 
seminar. The participants do not argue for argument’s 
sake...They intend their discussion to influence a decision 
the government will make, or a process that will affect how 
future decisions are made.46
Drawing on Tocqueville and Mill, Gutmann and Thompson know 
that for deliberation to work—for deliberation to endow its participants 
with the commitments necessary to make it work—it must culminate in 
consequential, binding decisions. If deliberation were not meaningful in this 
way, its influence, as Mill has already told us, would simply “fly over the 
heads” of its participants.
 The Tocquevillean and Millian notion of active citizenship comes out 
even more clearly in Cohen. Cohen channels Tocqueville and Mill when he 
emphasizes that the orientation necessary for democratic deliberation cannot 
simply be taken for granted: “Neither the commitment to nor the capacity for 
arriving at deliberative decisions is something that we can simply assume 
to obtain independent from the proper ordering of institutions.”47 Cohen 
recognizes that the mores of citizenship only come about when individuals 
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are provided the proper deliberative institutions—religious, recreational, 
and social associations, local self-government, political parties, juries, etc.—
that demand that they work in concert with their fellow citizens in the 
resolution of common concerns. As Cohen makes clear, forcing individuals 
to engage in deliberation inculcates a commitment to the process of 
deliberative decision-making and “the capacity for arriving at deliberative 
decisions.” This “capacity” is exactly what Tocqueville, Mill, and Gutmann 
and Thompson are getting at when they indicate that hearing the interests 
and concerns of others causes the citizen to recognize that many citizens are 
not satisfied with impersonal market outcomes. This capacity, then, is the 
shift in thinking that acknowledges that arriving to the optimal collective 
outcome requires conscious thought about what that optimal outcome might 
entail. Cohen continues: “Democratic politics...shapes the identity and interests 
of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of 
common good.”48 That is, engagement with the interests of others forces the 
citizen to acknowledge that he cannot describe the common good—he cannot 
determine what might be the optimal resolution—until he has thought about 
it and heard what his fellow citizens think.
 A Smithian classical liberal, skeptical of the possibility of an 
alternative to the market or top-down sovereignty, or a Downsian classical 
liberal, skeptical of any understanding of democracy that does not treat 
democratic decision-making as a political market place, might contend that 
individuals will only pretend to provide reasons and arguments advancing 
the common good. In actuality, these skeptics would maintain, individuals 
are simply disguising self-interest as the common interest. Cohen considers 
this very counter-argument,49 contending that it does not take seriously “the 
effects of deliberation on the motivations of deliberators.”50 That is, to argue 
that deliberators will disguise private interest as the common interest misses 
the entire point that the deliberative democrats are trying to make: being 
forced to hear the interests, opinions, preferences, and ideas of others compels 
deliberative participants to develop a real commitment to the interests and 
wellbeing of others. When citizens have this orientation they simply will not 
be satisfied with the outcomes given by an impersonal market. They know 
that conscious decision-making promises better, more satisfactory outcomes 
for all.  
 In reviving the notion of genuine citizenship from Tocqueville and 
Mill, the deliberative democrats are fundamentally calling into question 
the whole basis of the classical liberal project. To just assume rational self-
interest, always and everywhere, is analytically naive. Such an assumption 
does not take seriously the realistic complexity of human motivation. The 
form that it takes depends on the unique, mutable social experiences in 
which the individual is engaged. Tocqueville and Mill have made clear 
that active engagement in consequential deliberative forums can inculcate 
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a commitment to collectively resolving public issues oriented around 
the common good. Rawls, Cohen, Gutmann, and Thompson importantly 
recover this notion of active citizenship, and the mores that undergird it, in 
contemporary democratic theory. With a complex, realistic approach to social 
theory that does not try to simply abstract away from all of the complicating 
features of social life, we are left with a much more complete, realistic, and 
optimistic picture of human possibility. The deliberative democrats, by 
recovering what is really central in Tocqueville and Mill, importantly draw 
us this picture in the face of classical liberalism’s hegemony.  
Deliberation’s Limits
 Yet the deliberative democrats are quite worried about the possibility 
of democratic deliberation breaking down into chaos and violence, the very 
outcome that Smith and Friedman expect from any process of deliberative 
decision-making. The deliberative democrats’ concern seems to be that if 
deliberation becomes too contentious, the commitment that participants 
have to the process of deliberative decision-making will break down, 
and the various parties to deliberation will resort to violence to get what 
they want. The fear, then, that the deliberative democrats have is that if 
deliberation is too conflict-ridden, then we really might get the Hobbesian 
outcome—a war of all against all. The way the deliberative democrats deal 
with this threat is to narrow both the scope of deliberation and the type of 
“comprehensive religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines” that can be 
used in deliberation. That is, to ensure that deliberative participants do not 
abandon deliberation, the deliberative democrats decide contentious public 
issues before deliberation takes place and rule out the use of “controversial” 
reasons and arguments.
 Although the deliberative democrats are responding to a real 
concern, their response to this problem is misguided. What the deliberative 
democrats lose sight of is that narrowing the scope of deliberation to non-
controversial issues and preventing the use of controversial reasons and 
arguments would not serve to prevent a breakdown of the commitment 
to the deliberative process. Rather conflict and disagreement—which 
come about when controversial issues are debated and controversial 
arguments are made—are essential to the very process by which individuals 
develop the mores of citizenship. That is, deliberation only holds out the 
hope of inculcating solidarity among citizens if there is real conflict and 
disagreement among the deliberators. Deliberators only come to value the 
process of deliberation when they are exposed to divisive and conflicting 
interests and opinions. To limit the scope of deliberation and the forms that 
that deliberation can take, then, is not a solution to the specter of chaos and 
violence. Rather, it is a recipe for not allowing the mores of citizenship to 
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develop. Citizens will only agree upon the types of substantive outcomes 
that the deliberative democrats hope for and will refrain from making the 
sorts of controversial arguments that the deliberative democrats fear only if 
they are allowed to work through conflict and disagreement. Given, then, 
that conflict and disagreement are essential to the development of the mores 
of citizenship, the deliberative democrats too narrowly limit the activities 
that can inculcate a commitment to the common good and processes of 
collective decision-making. A whole host of antagonistic, non-deliberative 
activities, like protesting, marching, and striking, can likewise reinforce a 
commitment to democratic decision-making, expand the scope of issues up 
for deliberation, and resolve differences once deliberative channels have 
been exhausted.
 In their deliberative accounts, Rawls,Gutmann, and Thompson 
assume that certain fundamental public issues have already been decided 
before deliberation takes place. Rawls assumes that individuals in society 
have already agreed to his second principle of justice, which reads as follows:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.51
Although Rawls’ second principle leaves a lot of room for 
interpretation, no matter how it is interpreted its requirements are quite 
demanding: The social and economic position of those worst off in society 
must be maximized. Deliberation, then, can only be utilized to work out how 
society should achieve this demanding principle of justice. 
  Gutmann and Thompson similarly define the outcomes that are best 
for society prior to citizens actually engaging in any sort of deliberation. They 
define “basic opportunity” and “fair opportunity” as certain substantive 
principles that should obtain in any society. They are quite specific in 
defining basic and fair opportunity: “Health care, education, physical 
security, housing, food, employment, or the equivalents in income, are all 
goods that are especially important to living a decent life and securing other 
opportunities in our society.”52 That is, deliberation should not really be 
deciding what we might mean by “basic opportunity” or “fair opportunity,” 
or whether those are even outcomes that society values more than certain 
other things. For instance, any argument that tries to promote less than 
full employment as in the best interest of society has to be ruled out; we 
already know, before deliberation has taken place, that employment must 
be guaranteed to every member of society. Gutmann and Thompson become 
even more precise in defining the limits to deliberative outcomes: 
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The obligations on government can be simply stated: 
(1) guarantee child support; (2) make work pay; and (3) 
make work available. What specific reforms each of these 
implies is ultimately a question to be pursued in a process 
of democratic deliberation, but we can suggest the general 
shape that the answers might take.53
Not only have they already determined, before deliberation has 
taken place, that full employment with a high minimum wage along with 
government-financed child support is in the best interest of society, they even 
have a sense of the “general shape” of the specifics of those very reforms. 
Part of this “general shape,” for instance, will involve universal health care 
because “universal health care coverage is essential to basic opportunity.”54
  If Rawls demands that society must maximize the wellbeing of the 
least advantaged member of society, and Gutmann and Thompson demand 
that society must guarantee employment, a high minimum wage, child-care 
support, and universal health care coverage, what are citizens supposed 
to be deliberating about? All the really important issues have already been 
decided. The questions the deliberative democrats leave for deliberation are 
not“Should we have universal health care coverage?” and “Should society 
guarantee a job for everyone?”, but rather, “How should we structure the 
system of universal health care coverage that we have (supposedly) agreed 
upon?” and “What sort of reforms are needed to make sure that everyone is 
employed?” To deliberate about the latter set of questions is to deliberate in 
a vacuum; it is to skip over the really central issues that must be at the heart 
of deliberation.
 Rawls and Gutmann and Thompson’s impulse to resolve these 
contentious, controversial issues prior to any deliberation actually taking 
place seems to be based on their fear that allowing such fundamental issues 
to accede to the deliberative agenda is a recipe for chaos; surely if society 
is left to debate the provision of scarce but desired resources, like health 
care, housing, and income, the debate will quickly devolve into a fight and 
deliberation will break down. Citizens, rather than deciding whether or not 
they want universal health care coverage, can only be expected to decide 
the shape that that reform might take. But what the deliberative democrats 
are forgetting here is that citizens cannot simply be told by, say, a political 
theorist acting as a benevolent dictator, that they should have universal health 
care coverage or high minimum wages. A substantive commitment like that 
can only emerge when individuals are forced to engage in deliberation 
that compels them to hear the reasons, arguments, and testimony of less-
advantaged individuals. The commitment to an equitable health care system 
or a living wage, then, does not come when a political theorist tells members 
of society that they must implement those reforms. Rather, it comes when 
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there is conflict and disagreement over those issues, and individuals, in that 
process of conflict and disagreement, come to recognize the necessity of such 
reforms. The commitment to the common good that the citizen feels demands 
equitable health care coverage and living wages. He must come to feel that 
commitment himself. Conflict and disagreement in the deliberative process 
are essential.
 Rawls and Gutmann and Thompson’s impulse to limit the sorts of 
reasons and arguments that can be given in deliberative forums likewise 
seems to stem from a fear that deliberation will devolve into chaos if 
individuals make use of controversial reasons and arguments. Rawls quite 
clearly establishes what sort of reasons and arguments are off limits during 
deliberation:
In discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious 
and philosophical doctrines—to what we as individuals 
or members of associations see as the whole truth—nor to 
elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if 
these are in dispute.55
Much the same comes out in Gutmann and Thompson when 
they insist that during deliberation citizens should only make recourse to 
“relatively reliable methods of inquiry.”56 
 But to have a political theorist simply tell individuals that they 
cannot make use of their comprehensive religious, moral, and philosophical 
doctrines does not go very far towards making them believe that they should 
not use such doctrines. If someone is committed to a particular worldview—
whether it be evangelical Christianity or general equilibrium theory—he is not 
going to come to question the tenets of that worldview, and the applicability 
of that worldview to the common good, unless he makes recourse to that 
worldview in the deliberative forum. That is, the validity of the tenets of 
general equilibrium theory or socialism or evangelical Christianity can only 
be ascertained if these conflicting and contradictory ways of thinking about 
the world are used in deliberative settings. Being forced to make arguments 
that appeal to the interests of the deliberative group is what will force the 
classical liberal to perhaps abandon some of the tenets of general equilibrium 
theory or the evangelical Christian to perhaps abandon some of his literal 
interpretations of the Bible. A consensus about what sorts of arguments and 
ways of looking at the world are valid develops not by people being told that 
they must abandon their comprehensive doctrines before deliberation, but 
rather by hashing out which worldviews can really appeal to the interests of 
others. Certain arguments and reasons come to be ruled out in deliberation 
not because they have been ruled out before deliberation has taken place, but 
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rather because the very process of deliberation ensures that deliberators no 
longer take those types of arguments and reasons seriously.
 Working out which sorts of reasons and arguments can be oriented 
around the good of others would be wellandgood if all worldviews were 
listened to equally. But to assume that that is the case is to ignore reality: 
certain ways of thinking about the world, classical liberalism’s theory of 
the market, for instance, have achieved predominance in our debates and 
discussions. Often what is necessary, then, is forcing those involved in 
deliberation to listen to new concerns and ideas. Usually that is going to 
involve making use of a whole host of non-deliberative activities. A big part 
of the reason why we even have a commitment to deliberation, for example, 
is precisely because a whole host of explicitly non-deliberative, antagonistic 
activities helped establish deliberation as a framework to which Americans 
are, to some degree, committed. As Michael Walzer puts it: 
Indeed, what might be called the struggle for deliberative 
democracy—that is, for political equality, a free press, the 
right of association, civil rights for minorities, and so on—
has required a lot of slogan shouting. It is not easy to image 
a democratic politics to which popular mobilization has 
become superfluous.57
That is, “slogan shouting”—non-deliberative, antagonistic political 
activity—was necessary to get people with power to take deliberation 
seriously—to make them feel a commitment to such a process and to get 
them to recognize that such a process is essential to the common good. 
Walzer’s point is that the only reason anyone even takes deliberation 
seriously is precisely because its tenets were promoted in a non-deliberative 
fashion. Those who wanted a greater and more equal voice for all citizens 
had to protest, strike, and demonstrate. The very notion of deliberation was 
not taken seriously until those who wanted to expand deliberation’s scope 
undertook highly antagonistic activities that forced people to take deliberation 
seriously. 
 Once there is some general commitment to deliberation established, 
confrontational, non-deliberative methods are necessary to further expand 
the issues that should accede to the deliberative agenda. Walzer, again, 
makes this point nicely: 
Demonstrating intensity and conviction now doesn’t 
necessarily preclude negotiating later on, and this 
combination can be used, and has been, in defense of 
democratic rights—to vote, or strike, or associate freely—as 
well as in defense of substantive but contested reforms like 
prohibition, or gun control, or the minimum wage.58
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Even when citizens, to some degree or another, are committed to 
deliberative decision-making, issues often cannot reach the deliberative 
agenda until those that care deeply about those issues—those that feel 
resolving those issues in particular ways is fundamental to the common 
good—force other people, who perhaps disagree or are indifferent, to listen 
to them and take them seriously. More often than not this is going to involve 
protests, strikes, marches, and sit-ins. A big reason why management is 
willing to deliberate with unionized labor is precisely because labor has 
forced management to listen to them and take them seriously. By making 
use of the strike, labor has put its concerns on the deliberative agenda. The 
managers only come to feel a certain commitment to the welfare of labor 
if they are forced to feel that way by non-deliberative activities. One needs 
only to think back to the sit-ins, marches, and protests of the American Civil 
Rights Movement to be reminded that deliberation often only comes about 
after engagement in non-deliberative activities.
 Even when previously neglected issues accede to the deliberative 
agenda—even when civil rights or a minimum wage, for instance, become 
topics that people are willing to deliberate about—different ways of thinking 
about the common good will assure that deliberation will not often settle 
fundamental conflicts and differences in opinion. As Ian Shapiro has pointed 
out, deliberation might even sharpen conflict.59 That is, part of the sharpening, 
amending, and changing of preferences and opinions that occurs because 
of deliberation can actually serve to heighten the conflict and make clear 
that two sides are at an impasse. Should the two sides, both committed to 
the common good and to the process of deliberation, simply set aside their 
comprehensive doctrines to find some sort of agreement? The answer is no. 
When issues really matter, we should expect real conflict. Walzer, again, is 
instructive here:
Certain deep disagreements, like those between Left and 
Right, are remarkably persistent, and local forms of religious 
or ethnic conflict are often so embedded in a political 
culture as to seem natural to the participants. So politics 
is the endless return to these disagreements and conflicts, 
the struggle to manage and contain them, and, at the same 
time, to win whatever temporary victories are available. The 
democratic way to win is to educate, organize, mobilize...
more people than the other side has.60
Deliberation is essential. It allows us to develop a fundamental 
commitment to the common good and to recognize that the common 
good cannot be satisfied by the market. But the common good can mean 
irreconcilably different things to two sides. When the conflict is established, 
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or perhaps even clarified, by deliberation, the two sides must make recourse 
to non-deliberative activity; they must mobilize, organize, campaign, and 
propagandize to determine where the forces lie. Even a deliberative form of 
politics must often culminate in conflict. 
Conclusion
 Classical liberalism’s hegemony in the public discourse seems to be 
based on the fact that it demands and expects so little. Its guiding assumption 
tell us that people are the same, always and everywhere, and we can get 
the best by assuming the worst. Let us just assume humans are simple 
automatons, it seems to say, and then we can arrive at elegant and simple 
conclusions about how society works and, more importantly, should work. 
Humans, then, are rationally self-interested, and to get the best outcomes we 
should let these simple automatons interact in the market. Because the market 
does not really decide issues—it just gives outcomes—we can avoid conflict 
and disagreement by sidestepping issues that might actually result in conflict 
or by labeling outcomes as “just” simply because an impersonal system gives 
them. Democratic decision-making is not a real alternative; as Hobbes so 
elegantly demonstrated, letting rationally self-interested individuals interact 
without top-down sovereignty ultimately culminates in chaos and violence. 
Giventhat the political sphere must be one of top-down, hierarchical control, 
the classical liberals contend that we might as well maximize the scope of 
the market. Even those classical liberals that pay lip service to “democracy” 
take the simple assumptions of classical liberalism and apply them to the 
political sphere. A sphere of democratic decision-making, if it really exists, is 
just another extension of the market place. 
 The central point that comes from the deliberative democrats—and 
that they might do better to elaborate more explicitly—is that to assume 
simple rational self-interest and thus the impossibility of genuine democratic 
decision-making is really to miss the point. If we take a more realistic and 
complex view of human motivation, the deliberative democrats tell us, we 
recognize that individuals act in all sorts of different ways and are capable of 
developing and refining new and complex motivations. Recovering the notion 
of citizenship from Tocqueville and Mill, the deliberative democrats insist 
that individuals are capable of caring about the divergent and conflicting 
interests of their fellow citizens and of recognizing that a conscious decision 
about a public outcome is more satisfactory to more people than simply 
letting a market decide winners and losers. Starting with a complex notion of 
human possibility, the deliberative democrats, echoing Tocqueville and Mill, 
know that we cannot simply assume that individuals have the commitments 
and orientations necessary to make democratic decision-making work. Those 
very commitments and orientations are developed and refined, they argue, 
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in the give-and-take of reasons and ideas. 
 Unfortunately, the deliberative democrats try to narrow both the 
scope and form that deliberation can take in order to prevent circumstances 
in which deliberation breaks down into chaos and violence. Though they 
are responding to a real concern, trying to limit the scope and form of 
deliberationin order to eliminate conflict and disagreement defeats the whole 
purpose of deliberation; working through conflict and disagreement—
deciding which issues should be on the deliberative agenda and what sort 
of reasons can be given—is essential to developing the mores of citizenship. 
Given the importance of conflict and disagreement, political space must be 
left for non-deliberative activity. As Michael Walzer importantly points out, 
non-deliberative political activities can also foment the mores of citizenship, 
allow new issues to accede to the deliberative agenda, and resolve conflicts 
when a deliberative impasse has been reached.
 If the deliberative democrats are willing to acknowledge this 
important space for conflict and disagreement, what they have recovered 
from Tocqueville and Mill is an alternative program to Smith’s classical 
liberalism. What that program needs now are public champions willing and 
able to present this alternative way of thinking about the social world to 
members of society. Instead of every undergraduate hearing on the first day 
of economics class, “Let’s just assume humans are rationally self-interested 
and spend the better part of the next four years drawing a picture of society 
based on that assumption,” they might hear on the first day of social theory 
class, “Let’s assume that humans are complicated and spend the next four 
years thinking about the possibilities that open up for society.” What is 
needed is a revolution in ideas. 
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